Monday, August 2, 2010

Out at Home, Out for the Season: The Play that Cost the Tigers the 2010 Division Title

Everyone knows that Jim Leyland is a great baseball manager. He’s managed in over 2,800 games in the major leagues for the Pirates (eleven years), the Marlins (two years), the Rockies (one year), and the Tigers (four-and-a-half years and counting). He’s only the seventh manager in history to win pennants in both the National and American Leagues and a three-time Manager of the Year Award winner. He’s also a very good guy, respected, admired, and well liked by players, owners, and members of the press.

But, you know, even Jim Leyland makes mistakes. He made a fairly big one during a night game with the Toronto Blue Jays on July 24. And Leyland’s veteran third base coach, Gene Lamont, made an even bigger one.

Here’s what happened: Magglio Ordonez, the Tiger’s popular veteran right fielder and the team’s second best hitter, was suffering the effects of a sprained ankle and was unable to play the outfield. But he could still swing the bat and Leyland wanted him in there. At this point in the season, considering the status of the American League Central Division (the Tigers, Twins and the White Sox were in a three-way fight for the lead), every game was important. For several games Magglio had been in the line-up as the designated hitter, and Leyland decided to play him again in that role. This meant, of course, that Magglio would play offense and hit, but he would not play defense where, in his position in right field, he’d have to do a lot of running.

In the third inning, rookie centerfielder Austin Jackson singled. Magglio walked. At this point, Magglio was no longer a hitter; he’d become a runner. But he was not supposed to run. It wasn’t that he couldn’t run at all, it’s just that he’d have to run on his bum right ankle. The issue before Leyland thus became whether or not to remove Magglio for a pinch-runner. Doing that, of course, would remove him — and his bat — from the lineup for the remainder of the game. Leyland made the decision to leave Magglio in the game.

Next up was the clean-up hitter, Miguel Cabrera, who many regard as the best offensive player in baseball right now and who is a candidate for the coveted Triple Crown (first in batting average, runs batted in, and home runs over an entire season). At the time, Miguel was hitting around .349, had about 24 home runs, about 85 rbi’s and, in addition, led the Major Leagues in doubles with about 32. All of this meant that there was a very good likelihood that Cabrera would put the ball into play and turn Magglio into a baserunner, big time. Nobody seemed to be thinking about it, but Magglio was put in a very vulnerable situation.

And that’s just what happened. Miguel Cabrera lined a double into the gap off the wall in right-center, and Magglio began circling the bases, running as fast as he possibly could. Depending on how far and where the ball is hit, how quickly it is recovered by an outfielder and how quickly and accurately it is relayed by an infielder to the catcher, runners on first often score on a double. But not always; it depends on all those factors. It also depends on the speed of the baserunner. Which depends, in large part, on the condition of his wheels.

Jackson, starting from second base, scored easily. However, it was evident — or should have been — that an attempt by Magglio to score from first on Cabrera’s double would, at the very least, wind up in a close play at home. Nonetheless, as he approached third base, Gene Lamont, coaching at third base, waived Magglio home. As the play continued to develop and the ball was being relayed home, there was no doubt — to the experienced Lamont or anyone else watching — that Magglio would have to slide in order to avoid being tagged out. Lamont’s decision to push Magglio to score on Cabrera’s double — the second coaching decision affecting the play — put Magglio at risk even more than the earlier decision to allow him to run the bases. And if the first decision was questionable, this one was disastrous.

Why was Magglio placed at risk by these decisions? The answer to that is pretty obvious. Magglio was put at risk when he was made a baserunner because he had a sprained ankle, an injury that occurs when the ligaments in the ankle are forced beyond their normal range of motion and are torn. Ligaments are tough, elastic bands of fibrous tissue that connect one bone to another and help stabilize joints, preventing excessive movement. Magglio was at risk because he was put into a position where he would be required to run, and possibly run hard, and where the stability of his ankle would very likely be tested to the max.

Well, we now know how it turned out. Magglio was laboring as he rounded third and headed for home. He did have to slide, which he did, and he was tagged out, about ten feet from home plate — it wasn’t even close. (He shouldn’t have been sent home even had he been in the best of health.) Far more important, however, was that in the process of sliding the cleats on Magglio’s right foot dug slightly into the dirt around home plate resulting in his ankle being again twisted. His ankle ligaments not being sufficient to withstand the trauma and maintain stability of the joint, Magglio suffered a fracture to his already injured right ankle. He will be out of action for six to eight weeks, and will probably not return until after September 1.

After the game, Johnny Damon (who, because of a bad back, also hasn’t been playing recently) told reporters: “I saw his right foot go another direction and I was hoping it was just a sprain, but unfortunately it was more severe. Anytime you lose a guy like that, it’s huge. He’s the No. 3 hitter. He’s that bridge from me to Cabrera, so it’s tough. And the length of time we’re going to lose him — it’s six to eight weeks. So we know that could very well be the [end of his] season.”

And, most likely, it was also the end of the Tigers’ season, the end of their hopes to win a division title this year and to get into post-season play. Leyland couldn’t have known it at the time he let Magglio run the bases, but three innings later Carlos Guillen, the Tiger’s star second baseman, would suffer a right calf strain that would place him on the 15-day disabled list. On the other hand, it was known at the time that Brandon Inge, the able and likeable Tigers’ third baseman, in a game with the Texas Rangers six days earlier had suffered a broken hand after being struck by a pitch. Inge was not expected to return for four-to-six weeks.

Thus, in the course of a week, three of the Tiger’s first seven hitters wound up out of commission for extended periods of time. Moreover, with the trading deadline approaching on July 31, there was no way the damage could be repaired simply by engaging in one or more “rent-a-player”-type trades that have recently become part of the baseball scene. (These trades involve a contending team sending secondary players and/or minor league prospects, often good ones, to other teams for established players who will become free agents at the end of the season. The star players in the trades may only play for the contender until their contracts expire at the end of the season; thus the term “rent-a-player.”)

In a post-game interview, Jim Leyland told reporters that “We’ve got to revamp this whole thing now. I haven’t even talked to [general manager Dave Dombrowski] yet. I have no idea who’s coming up [from the minors to replace Ordonez and Guillen]. I have no idea what we’re doing.”

The Tigers were suddenly in a terrible position, particularly because they’ve relied so heavily this season on rookies — Austin Jackson, Brennan Boesch, Scott Sizemore, Danny Worth, Alex Avila and Robbie Weinhardt. Later on, Dombrowski said that he had no intention of trading away these guys or every other good prospect in the Tiger’s organization for end-of-the-season starters in an effort that would be problematic, at best. Arguably, the Tigers needed another good bat in the lineup to make it to the play-offs even before the injuries occurred, and while you can sometimes fill a spot, or even a couple of spots with prospects-for-veteran type trades, there’s only a slim possibility of repairing the wide-spread damage the Tigers have suffered that way.

On July 30, in the first game of a series in Boston with the Red Sox, Jhonny Peralta, just obtained from Cleveland in a trade, homered twice that night in his first appearance as a Tiger. While the Tigers held on to win, staving off a grand slam home run by David Ortiz in the 9th inning, I noticed that the last three batters for the Tigers were hitting .187, .201, and .210, respectively. This at a time when 31% of the Tigers’ run production was coming from one man, Miguel Cabrera, and when the Tigers had won only 4 of their last 18 games since the All-Star break when they were in first place in the division. (They’re now in a free-fall, 7.0 games behind the White Sox and 6.5 behind the Twins.) With an offensive weakness that profound, the only reason that the Tigers are hanging on to third place is that Kansas City and Cleveland (the other two teams in the Central Division) are playing so poorly. But now it’s virtually impossible that the Tigers will be able win the division this year.

Admittedly, this analysis has the benefit of 20/20 hindsight. Nonetheless, though Leyland’s decision to let Ordonez run ahead of Cabrera was not terrible, it was, I think, a mistake. But hindsight or not, Lamont’s decision to waive him home was surely a mistake and was indeed terrible.

So it was. The decisions regarding how to play Magglio Ordonez on July 24 in the game against the Blue Jays were deadly for the Tigers’ hopes for the post-season this year. Once a contender, they now have a very little chance of passing the Twins and the White Sox, and because of their mediocre record (they’re only playing around .500 for the season) they’re already out of the wild card race.

And those decisions didn’t do Magglio Ordonez much good either. Not only was he enjoying another very good year, but at the time of his injury he was 175 plate appearances of 54 games shy of the vesting option in his contract that would guarantee him $15 million in 2011. As one reporter pointed out, the odds of that happening at this point are somewhere between slim and none.

It’s likely that very few fans realized just how important those decisions were on July 24th — both occurring in a game played two-and-a-half months before the end of the season. But they probably meant the end of a successful season in 2010 for both the Tigers and for Magglio Ordonez.